

Congressman Gore probably will ask Admiral Inman:

"Do you believe that the thousands of students from Bloc countries who are in the US cause significant problems regarding unwanted technology transfer? What is the magnitude of the problem?"

POINT PAPER

--Visitors to the US are one of many avenues of technology transfer to Communist countries.

--Among the visitors, graduate-level students and researchers in the hard sciences and in engineering are most likely to be of concern.

--In these categories, there have been during the past year a few hundred Soviet and Eastern European students and several thousand Chinese graduate scholars.

--The individual programs need to be looked at in order to gauge the extent of technology transfer concern.

--Sometimes research topics are in areas of "emerging technologies" where significant military and other applications are just becoming recognized and the technologies are not yet either classified or export controlled.

--Other technologies under existing law and regulation cannot be exported--for example by showing it to visitors who will return to Communist countries--without a license review by Commerce or other appropriate agencies.

--In other instances, the US Government has a "proprietary" interest in the university research, which may well be being funded via US Government contracts or grants.

--These determinations are the responsibilities of the policy agencies (e.g., State, Defense, Commerce); the Intelligence Community supports these deliberations by providing intelligence information and analysis regarding the likely impact of the expected transfer of technology.

--The Intelligence Community provides several hundred formal interagency opinions on such cases each year, and a similar number of less formal and less coordinated opinions (e.g., when time is of the essence).

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--When everything works right, the unwanted technology transfer is prevented, that is the troublesome program is avoided or modified.

--There are many problems, however. For example:

--Adequate and timely information often is not available, particularly regarding Soviet and East European programs that are privately funded and regarding the Chinese scholars. This limits the usefulness and usability of the IC opinions and inhibits timely and relevant action by the policy agencies.

--Inadequate governmental resources have aggravated the problem noted above (e.g., the shortage of State EE officers available to make inquiries of US hosts regarding proposed communist visitors).

--Historically, visa applications have not been considered and acted upon in light of technology transfer concerns.

--Commerce and other regulations concerning the export of technical data are not well known or understood in academe.

--Working out reasonable and feasible constraints on the access to technology afforded foreign communist visitors very often requires the understanding and cooperation of US academic hosts. This has not always been forthcoming.

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